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Balance Sheet optimization tool – Under the Basel III framework 
The most recent regulatory framework implemented by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) was introduced as an incentive to enhance market discipline and supervisory 
power of the regulatory authorities. However, these changes seem to challenge financial institutions 
in structural aspects that could negatively impact the profit efficiency. This paper tries to fill this 
risk management role need by presenting a customized tool that enables banks to effectively 
manage their balance sheet, while taking into account the constraints required by Basel III. 
Following that, this paper also investigates the impact of the Basel III requirements on several 
parameters and finishes with two types of impact studies. The first type addresses the banking 
regulatory requirements and the second performs stress tests.  
The study used real data of a Portuguese commercial bank named through the paper as ‘Bank I’. 
Our results suggest that the tool manages to significantly improve the profitability of ‘Bank I’ while 
making it compliant with the Basel III framework by finding its optimal balance sheet composition. 
It also shows that both capital and liquidity requirements have a negative impact on the retained 
profit. Concerning the results taken from the stress tests we conclude that higher restrictions 
influence negatively the retained profit and that under certain stress scenarios ‘Bank I’ would 
present worryingly high losses. 
The tool does not capture the cost of changing the composition of the balance sheet, even though 
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1.1 - Introduction 
 
The last financial crisis (late 2007) exposed several weaknesses in the overall banking system. The 
regulatory framework implemented at that time proved to be insufficient for banks to absorb 
unexpected losses in certain situations of financial distress. For that reason, in December 2010, the 
regulatory authorities (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision - BCBS) introduced “Basel III: A 
global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking system” and a consultation 
document, with a later revision on June 2011. The documents gave a new set of revisions and norms 
to further complement the regulatory system, in order to increase effectiveness where the previous 
regime failed. 
The major focus of the enhanced rules are, firstly, the establishment of stricter capital standards 
through more restrictive capital definitions, higher weights on the risk weighted assets (RWA) 
computation, higher minimum capital requirements, and two additional capital buffers. Secondly, it 
aims to strengthen liquidity rules by imposing two liquidity ratios. 
“Increased capital requirements, (…) and deal with the regulatory reform will put pressure on 
margins (…). Investor returns will likely decrease at a time when firms need to encourage enhanced 
investment to rebuild and restore buffers.1” 
As mentioned in the citation above extracted from a consultative document, and as various other 
studies demonstrate2, the implementation of such rules will be a challenge to the banking industry, 
as it will foment pressure on a bank’s profitability and return on equity. 
Among the different businesses in which banks operate (retail, commercial, insurance etc.), the 
capital market operations will be the most affected. Stricter capital requirements, will undoubtedly 
impact sales and trading activities, as well as all the others areas connected to it such as 
securitizations and OTC3 derivatives. 
                                                     
1 “Basel III: Issues and implication” (KPMG), 2011 
2 “McKinsey working papers on risk number 26”; “Basel III and Its Consequences” (Accenture) 




The previously mentioned liquidity measures will also impose restrictions on financial institutions 
as they will have to be able to deal with higher funding costs from the adoption of strategies to limit 
unstable sources of funding. 
Despite all the difficulties financial institutions might have in the forthcoming years, as AN Berger 
& CHS Bowman (2013)4 observe, these measures are seen to be fundamental in order to reduce the 
probability of insolvency, to maintain financial healthiness, as well as the reliability on the banking 
industry, and consequently lead to economic stability.  
However, it is important to mention that theory provides conflicting opinions regarding the positive 
correlation between capital requirements and risk reduction in banking. As Blum (1999)5 argues, 
capital requirements may increase risk-taking behaviors: 
“If raising equity is excessively costly, the only possibility to increase equity tomorrow is to 
increase risk today”. 
Financial institutions will have to be able to balance shareholder’s demands and expectations, as 
well as the requirements of supervisory authorities, forcing them to look for a good equilibrium 
between solvency, liquidity and profitability. 
Therefore, there is an urge for banks to evaluate the impact of the framework on their structure 
through capital planning and optimization processes. Institutions will have to reassess their 
operational, strategic and financial management structures to obtain their optimal balance sheet mix. 
Further, there should be an emphasis on organic capital generation within the transition along the 
years of implementation of Basel III rules, as well as on strategies to manage RWA’s. 
How should the optimal balance sheet composition of a bank be, in order to maximize its returns, 
while making it compliant with the Basel III framework? 
As the banking industry has shown an impressive evolution over the last decades, and being the 
financial crisis a very recent event, there is a clear lack of available material on this topic. This 
study intends to further contribute to existing literature on the subject by presenting a customized 
modeling tool that enables each financial institution to effectively manage its balance sheet, while 
taking into account not only the constraints required by the new framework presented in Basel III 
but also its specificities, risk profile and strategic objectives. 
                                                     
4 “How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises”- Allen N. Berger, Christa H.S. 
Bouwman - Journal of Financial Economics, 2013 





The tool contains a balance sheet optimization stochastic model which is used for optimization and 
simulation purposes. The tool is customized so that it could be adapted to each financial 
institutions’ specifications, such as its dimension, core business as well as its economic situation. 
The data used consisted on the financial figures of a Portuguese commercial bank for the year of 
2013, named ‘Bank I’ for confidential purposes. Observing the outcomes of the model, it can be 
concluded that it manages to propose a balance sheet composition that increases the profitability of 
‘Bank I’, while making it compliant with the requirements imposed by the Basel III framework. 
This paper is structured as follows. Part II introduces the reader to the topic by describing the 
current situation of the banking industry and its regulation of the last years. Part III is divided in 
four sections and describes the model and results. Section I, describes the components of the model, 
Section II gives insights about the optimization technique. Section III explains the data and 
assumptions the model relied on. Section IV presents the results of the simulation and the results of 
the two impact studies. Finally, Part IV presents the concluding remarks and suggestions for further 
research on this topic. The annexes serve as a complement of additional information to respect 








2.1 – Financial crisis: Antecedents 
 
Liquidity in financial markets was a major problem during the crisis of late 2007. 
To analyze the main causes of this event, two perspectives are explored, namely the two sides of a 
trade process. The “buy-side” and the “sell-side”. 
The greater stability preceding the 2007 crisis (Blanchard & Simon (2001) 6 , Dalsgaard & Jørgen 
Elmeskov (2002)7), is likely to have given a naïve sense of reduced risk to investors, which 
probably increased the appetite on the “buy-side” for riskier financial instruments and leverage. 
Adding to that, a number of potentially destabilizing events such as the LTCM collapse, the Eastern 
Europe and Asian crises, the dot-com bubble of 2000; and the 9/11 attack, were overcome 
amazingly quickly. 
Still on the “buy-side”, arbitrageurs and investors leveraged their investments using collateralized 
borrowings from brokers who set margins as collateral to keep within their Value at Risk measure 
(VaR). In a margin account, the broker can re-evaluate its position and sell the securities locking the 
losses of the investor, in case stock prices decline aggressively. The investor, who will not be able 
to participate in any eventual future rebound of the stock, is confronted with funding liquidity risk. 
On the “sell-side”, in the first instance, banks developed methodologies to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage, by grouping certain types of assets (structured asset-backed securities – ABS) and by 
selling them as a package to other financial institutions or private investors, spreading these risky 
instruments among the institutions that compose the financial market. The ABS contained different 
types of loans, mortgages, receivables, bonds and etc., so that banks could take advantage of having 
much less regulatory capital required to keep securitized debt instruments than they would have for 
holding the assets themselves. 
                                                     
6 “Ongoing changes in the business cycle – evidence and causes”- Thomas Dalsgaard, Jørgen Elmeskov and 
Cyn-Young Park - SUERF, 2002 
7 “The Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility”- O Blanchard, J Simon - Brookings papers on 




Financial institutions were therefore extremely leveraged with debt, and “contrary to intuition, 
empirical evidence has shown that bank leverage rises during boom times and falls during 
downturns. (…) the expansion and contraction of the balance sheet amplify rather than counteract 
the credit cycle”8 (pro-cyclicality of leverage). In other words, financial institutions manage their 
leverage using collateralized borrowings and lending, hence, monetary policy has an impact in how 
the bank’s balance sheet grows as it “anticipates the potential disorderly unwinding of leverage” 9. 
The balance sheet of financial institutions contracts when monetary policy is “tight”, reducing the 
liquidity. On the contrary, when monetary policy is “loose”, financial institutions tend to expand 
their balance sheets, increasing the liquidity supply.  
The purchase of ABS was commonly hedged by buying credit default swaps (CDS), which is a 
protection against the default of the asset. 
While institutions became holders of this securitized debt instruments, and as market participants 
held an excessive amount of CDS against the default of the assets, institutions had a huge exposure 
to wrong way risk, which could easily “blow up” in a situation of financial distress. 
Thus, financial institutions had much exposure between themselves and were much more exposed 
to structured financial instruments. 
Secondly, the desynchronization between the maturity of inflows and outflows of financial 
institutions, known as maturity mismatch10, induces funding liquidity risk. This mismatch occurs 
because the big part of the assets of a bank has greater maturity than its debt instruments, making 
them to be repeatedly refinanced. Many banks were engaging in funding strategies that relied on 
short term funding, increasing their exposure to funding liquidity risk. 
As referred by Kashyap et al. (2008)11, it is difficult to tell whether an investor/financial manager is 
generating true risk adjusted excess returns, or whether the current returns are simply compensation 
for a risk that is higher than assessed, especially with new financial instruments. 
As it turns out, there were misleading proxies for risk assessment before the crisis that were not able 
to capture the true risk of these financial products. 
                                                     
8 “The LR world bank: A New Binding Limit on Banks”- Katia D’Hulster (2011) - The worldbank 
9 “Financial intermediaries, financial stability, and monetary policy”- T Adrian & HS Shin (2008) - FRB of 
New York Staff Report 
 
10 For more detail see: “Collective moral hazard, maturity mismatch and systemic bailouts” - Emmanuel 
Farhi, Jean Tirole (2009) - nber.org 




Having that, it was just a matter of having a financial stress situation to trigger the blow up of the 
imbalances. The trigger was “an increase in subprime mortgages defaults”12 and the increase of 
interest rates, which made homeowners unable to meet their financial obligations, plumbing even 
more house prices. For more details about the causes of the most recent financial crisis see Acharya 
et al. (2009)13 
While banks had much exposure to maturity mismatch between their assets and debt instruments, 
and were highly leveraged with debt, the uncertainty and the substantial increase on mortgages 
defaults led bank’s funding sources to exhaust, finding themselves short on cash to meet their 
obligations. An amplified domino effect was produced instantly, ending with the collapse of the 
stock market. Many central banks and governments injected great amounts of liquidity in 
institutions for the sake of financial stability. 
 
 
2.2 - Basel Framework 
 
2.2.1 - BIS 
 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is the oldest financial organization and helps central 
banks in their pursuit of monetary and financial stability. Its role is to promote communication 
between them and to conduct research on policy effects on issues confronting central banks and 
financial supervisory authorities. 
Along with ten central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, the United States Germany and Sweden, the BIS established a committee called 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) that would function as a forum that would meet 
every three months for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters, as well as to propose 
the regulatory framework needed to have financial stability. 
“The economic, monetary, financial and legal research of the BIS supports its meetings and the 
activities of the Basel-based committees. The BIS is also a hub for sharing statistical information 
                                                     
12 “Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007-08”; Markus K. Brunnermeier (2008) – NBER papers 
13 “The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Causes and Remedies”- V Acharya, T Philippon, M Richardson and 




amongst central banks, and for publishing statistics on global banking, securities, foreign exchange 
and derivatives markets.”14 
Therefore, this organization is very important to the financial system’s health, since it regulates 
capital adequacy of banks and encourages transparency. 
The Committee is further sub-divided in four divisions: 
Standards Implementation Group (SIG), Policy Development Group (PDG), Accounting Task Force 
(ATF), Basel Consultative Group (BCG), in which each has specific task forces to work on. 
In the majority of European countries, these binding capital rules are presented in the Capital 
Requirements Regulation and Directive (CRD IV), which is the EU implementation of Basel III and 
applies to banks and investment firms. 
Along the years of existence, the BCBS became the main structure for influencing banking 
supervisory standards. 
 
2.2.2 - Regulatory History 
 
There are important intentions in having directives in the banking industry. Since financial 
institutions provide several vital services to the economy of the respective country/region, they are 
highly regulated. The increasing integrity of financial global financial markets and the reliance that 
economies hold on banks, makes it imperative for regulatory organizations to maintain control over 
certain practices of these institutions. 
Other motivations supporting the need of banking regulation are related to asymmetric information 
and its consequences, such as adverse selection and moral hazard between financial institutions and 
depositors. As bank debt is mainly help by a great number of small depositors, without a 
representative of depositors that would monitor their activities, banks would have freedom with 
their funding to perform highly risky investments. 
Regulatory capital requirements for financial institutions are part of a broader set of measures used 
in banking prudential regulation and we have seen that financial regulation and supervision have an 
important role in maintaining integrity in the financial system, giving market confidence (liquidity 
                                                     




role), and investors protection. Due to the measures imposed along the years of existence, financial 
regulation has also influenced the structure of the banking system. 
Bank regulation pursues in implementing capital and liquidity requirements, reserve requirements, 
corporate governance, financial disclosure requirements, credit rating requirements, risk exposures 
quantification, activity and affiliation restrictions. 
 
2.2.3 - Basel I 
 
Basel I was the first Basel accord presented by the BCBS in 1988 (and effective on 1992) with the 
goal to create a level playing field for “internationally active banks”. The focus was on credit risk 
and in preventing international banks from building business volume without adequate capital 
backing, meaning that banks from different countries competing for the same loans would have to 
set aside roughly the same amount of capital in the loans. 
Hence, this accord was welcomed for incorporating risk into the calculation of capital requirements. 
Cooke Ratio. This ratio named after Peter Cooke (Bank of England and chairman of BCBS at that 
time), informed that each bank must maintain a total risk-weighted capital ratio of at least 8%, in 
which the weights attributed to each asset depended on the institutional nature of the borrower. 
The capital amount to compute this ratio was composed by Tier 1, composed by the shareholder’s 
equity and retained profits, and Tier 2, composed by additional resources. The minimum amount of 
Tier 1 capital should be 50% of the total capital. 
The Basel I accord grouped assets into four risk weights classes (below). 
 
 
Asset Type Risk Weight Attributed 
Cash 0% 
Government security (OECD)  




Secured loans by residential 
properties 
50% 
Corporate Loans 100% 
 
Table 1: Basel I - Standardized Approach Risk weights per class 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑊𝐴 =∑(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (𝑖)𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
)       𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑖 = 1, 2, 3…𝑛 
Being fairly simple to monitor, as it applied to all loans of a particular category, the costs incurred 
in its computations were little. However, this simplistic categorization that for example did not 
distinguish between loans of very different degrees of credit risk, did not reflect the “real” risk a 
certain borrower actually possessed which caused banks, and its depositors, being in more risky 
positions than accounted for. Adding to that, this accord did also not account for other type of more 
complex instruments. Especially for investment banks, their operations relied a lot on sales and 
trading and the exposure to this type of complex financial instruments was not captured by the 
Basel I standards, whether risky or not. Financial institutions exploit variances between a portfolio’s 
“real” risk and the risk measured by the regulation, known as regulatory capital arbitrage (RCA). As 
Jones (2000)15 referred, RCA has challenged the effectiveness of Basel I as the capital ratios 
became no longer reliable measures of capital adequacy. 
Ignoring the risks not evaluated by the standards, only promoted an underestimation of the risks 
incurred by the financial institution. 
 
 
2.2.4 - Basel II16 
 
                                                     
15 “Emerging problems with the Basel Capital Accord: regulatory capital arbitrage and related issues” – D 
Jones, (2000) 
16 See “The new basel capital framework and its implementation in the European union” – F Dierick, Fatima 





Aware of the inaccuracy of the framework established in that time, the BCBS issued a consultative 
paper to address the major limitations of Basel I (June 1999) and Basel II. However, this accord was 
only finally published in 2004 and planned to be implemented from 2006.  
First, the Committee pointed out that Basel I was able to achieve certain goals needed to a more 
robust financial system: 
“The Committee believes the 1988 Accord and subsequent additions and amendments have helped 
to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system and have enhanced 
competitive equality among internationally active banks. (…)The widespread adoption of the 
Accord in many countries has contributed to achievement of the objective of competitive equality17” 
However, they also highlighted three important existing flaws18: 
1- “However, the financial world has (…) evolved significantly (…) to the point where a 
bank’s capital ratio, calculated using the current Accord, may not always be a good 
indicator of its financial condition. The current (…) degrees of credit risk exposure are not 
sufficiently calibrated as to adequately differentiate between borrowers' differing default 
risks” 
2- “(...) ability of banks to arbitrage their regulatory capital requirements and exploit 
divergences between true economic risk and risk measured under the Accord. Regulatory 
capital arbitrage can occur in several ways, for example, through some forms of 
securitization, and can lead to a shift in banks’ portfolio concentrations to lower quality 
assets” 
3- “(…) the Accord does not provide the proper incentives for risk mitigation techniques. For 
example, there is only minimal capital relief for collateral, and in some cases, the Accord’s 
structure discourages the use of credit risk mitigation techniques” 
 
This new framework dealt with one of the key flaws of Basel I already referred. It finally addressed 
the capital requirements needed in function of its risk weighted assets (RWA’s). Both the class of 
the borrower (retail, financial firms, non-financial corporations etc.) and the particular risk of each 
counterparty within a class, would determine the risk weight used to compute the capital required to 
be in compliance with the accord. 
                                                     
17 BIS  – Consultative Paper – June 1999, page 8, paragraph 5 





Basel II was built upon three Pillars: 
PILLAR I. MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
It points out the capital requirements given a calculated amount for three types of risk: 
Credit risk, operational risk and market risk. 
A. Credit Risk. 
According to Basel II rules, banks may adopt one of the two following approaches to compute their 
minimum capital requirements for credit risk: 
 The Standardized Approach (SA) 
Under this approach, each asset exposure (amount) is given a risk weight. The sum of all the risk 
weighted exposures gives the total RWA of the institution. The risk weight is based on an external 
rating institution’s assessment of the counterparty risk. 
This approach seems to rely on a non-realistic assumption, as in many countries no external ratings 
exist for several corporate loans. Therefore, capital charges for loans to unrated companies remain 
unchanged compared to Basel I19. 
 The Internal Rating Based approach (IRB) 




Additionally, banks could choose between the ‘Foundation’ and the ‘Advanced’ variants. While 
using the first variant, they were obliged to disclose the first parameter (Probability of Default) 
obtained by their internal methods. The other three parameters would be set out by the regulatory 
authorities. On the other hand, financial firms could adopt the ‘Advanced’ variant, in which they 
                                                     
19 See “Bank size and risk-taking under Basel II”-  Hakenes and Schnabel(2006), page 4, for more detailed 
information about limitations on using the Standardized Approach 
ParameterDescription
PD Borrower's Probability of Default
LGD Percentage of loss over exposure amount in case of default
EAD Gross exposure under a facility upon default of an obligor
M Maturity of asset the exposure




had to collect sufficient data on loans to develop a method for rating them within various portfolios. 
Therefore, they would be responsible for developing and disclose the four parameters obtained from 
their own internal computations. 
This requires highly complex modelling and offers the financial institutions with the necessary 
expertise the possibility of deriving more risk sensitive weights. 
By observing the simplistic example given in Appendix 1 of this document, it can be understood the 
purpose Pillar I tries to achieve by setting a much greater amount of required capital in loss-prone 
loans (risky loans) than those carried out by lower risk loans. 
As it would be expected, not every financial firm would be qualified to adopt the IRB approach 
(especially the AIRB), as Basel II provides a list of minimum requirements to be fulfilled and its 
adoption would be accompanied by increased costs (staff, technology, recruitment & education 
etc.). Nevertheless, banks have incentives to use this approach as essentially its adoption would 
imply lower capital requirements20. This was captured, under certain conditions (bull market 
conditions and for the sample used), by the studies issued by the BCBS on 2006 (Quantitative 
Impact Study 5), in which they conclude that for the sample used, the capital requirements under the 
IRB, and especially the AIRB, compared to those under Basel I framework, are significantly lower. 
B. Operational Risk21 
“Operational Risk is not a new risk… However, the idea that operational risk management is a 
discipline with its own management structure, tolls and processes… is new.” (British Bankers 
Association website) 
There are many definitions for operational risk22. Essentially, it is the risk of loss resulting from 
internal processes, people, systems and models or from external events like legal risks, excluding 
the market, credit, liquidity, strategic and reputational risks. 
There are three methods that could be used: 
i) Basic Indicator approach: the required capital is 15% of the bank's three-year average 
gross income. It is the simplest approach. 
                                                     
20 See “Bank size and risk-taking under Basel II “- Hakenes and Schnabel (2006) and “Loan pricing under 
Basel capital requirements”- Rafael Repullo and Javier Suarez (2003), page 3, for more information 
21 Operational risk events can be quite expensive. Citibank and JP Morgan Chase suffered large losses from 
Enron and MCI, the Royal Bank of Scotland took a large fraud loss from their subsidiary All First Financial 




ii) Standardized Approach: it distinguishes eight different business lines in which each 
receives the respective risk weight. Meant for somewhat more sophisticated banks. 
iii) Advanced Measurement Approach: it contains the use of four data elements. External 
loss data, internal, scenario analysis and business environment and internal control 
factors. It must be approved by the national supervisor and it is made for banks that use 
the IRB approach to evaluate credit risk. 
 
C. Market Risk 
“Market risk is defined as the risk of losses in on and off-balance sheet positions arising from 
movements in market prices. The risks subject to this requirement are: 
- the risks pertaining to interest rate related instruments and equities in the trading book; 
- foreign exchange risk and commodities risk throughout the bank” (BIS, 1996, page 1) 
It is mandatory for financial institutions to disclose certain information to other market participants 
about their risk profiles and regulatory capital procedures. The preferred approach used is the Value 
at Risk (VaR) or the more complex Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR)23. 
This type of risk in the Pillar I of Basel II is computed in the same manner as under Basel I and 
remained unchanged. 
The complexity of Pillar I of Basel II resides on the fact that banks have many different asset 
classes that require different treatment. Minimum standards must be established for rating system 
design, including testing and documentation requirements. 
PILLAR II. SUPERVISORY REVIEW PROCESS 
It focuses on supervisory oversight. It requires supervisors to review a bank’s capital adequacy 
assessment process, which may indicate a higher capital requirement than Pillar I minimums. 
PILLAR III. MARKET DISCIPLINE 
It looks at market discipline and public disclosure by setting out requirements on banks to publish 
information about their risk exposure, risk management, and other more strategic information 
disclosures. 
Conclusion on Basel II. 
                                                     




Basel II lays down a more comprehensive measure and minimum standard for capital adequacy. It 
seeks to improve on existing rules by aligning regulatory capital requirements more closely to 
underlying risks that banks face. Finally, it attempts to fix some of the problems from the original 
accord by defining risk more accurately. 
 
 
2.2.5 - Basel III 
 
“The objective of the reforms is to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising 
from financial and economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from 
the financial sector to the real economy. This document sets out the rules text and timelines to 
implement the Basel III framework.24” 
In response to the current crisis beginning in 2007, in 2012 the Basel Committee issued the 
consultative document entitled “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector” commonly 
referred as Basel III and the “International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards 
and Monitoring”. 
This framework was to be implemented from 2013 to 2019. 
The financial firms were unable to absorb the unexpected losses observed in the capital markets. 
Hence, sudden changes in asset quality and value quickly wiped out the bank’s capital. Adding to 
that, the interconnectedness of institutions, the already referred maturity mismatch between 
liabilities and assets, and the pro-cyclical deleveraging effect accelerated the decline of the asset’s 
value. 
Before Basel III, the regulation did not account the pro-cyclical effect. This subject is developed in 
the following section. 
In terms of the strengthening of the capital framework, the new rules update the three pillars of the 
previous regime upon five different aims: 
 
1. Raise quality and transparency of the capital base 
                                                     





Under Basel III the definition of capital will be restricted. The Committee sees as critical that 
bank’s risk exposures are backed by a high quality capital base. Adding to that, inconsistencies in 
the definition of capital across banks between and within different countries made it merely 
impossible to the market to compare the quality of capital between financial institutions. 
Total regulatory capital will consist on the sum of ‘Core Tier 1‘capital and ‘Tier 2’ capital. 
 
i) Tier 1 Capital  
 
a. Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) 
b. Additional Tier 1 capital 
 
ii) Tier 2 capital  
 
There is a single criteria for instruments included on each of the three categories. 
Common Equity Tier 1 capital 
• Common shares issued by the bank 
• Stock surplus (share premium) resulting from instruments issued included in CET1 
• Retained profit 
• Accumulated other comprehensive income and other reserves 
• Common shares issued by consolidated subsidiaries (minority interest) that meet criteria; 
• Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of CET1 
 
Additional Tier 1 capital 
• Instruments issued by bank that meet criteria for Add Tier 1 capital not included in CET1 
• Stock surplus (share premium) resulting from instruments issued included in Add Tier1 
• Instruments issued by consolidate subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties that 
meet the criteria 





Tier 2 capital 
• Instruments issued by bank that meet criteria for Add Tier 1 capital not included in Tier 1 
• Stock surplus (share premium) resulting from instruments issued included in Tier 2 
• Instruments issued by consolidate subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties that 
meet the criteria 
• Certain loan loss provisions26 
• Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Additional Tier 2 capital 
 
 
2. Enhancing risk coverage, particularly the counterparty risk 
 
Under Basel III, financial institutions must add a capital charge to cover mark-to-market 
counterparty risk losses (Credit Value Adjustments – CVA) for OTC derivatives. Moreover, the 
Committee is raising counterparty credit risk (CCR) management standards like the treatment of 
wrong-way risk. These measures along with the other described more profoundly in the official 
document will create strong incentives for banks to move exposures to such central counterparties 
(CCPs). 
3. Supplementing the risk-based capital requirement with a LR27 
 
Excessive accumulation of on-and-off-balance sheet leverage was other cause for the incapacity of 
banks to absorb accumulated losses. The needed deleverage process led to a decrease in credit 
availability in the market. 
As a measure to control the excessive leveraging, a leverage ratio (LR) defined by the percentage of 
own capital per unit of assets was set at 3%, hence, a bank's total assets (both on-and-off-balance 
                                                     
26 As specified in “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems” 
paragraph 60 and 61 
27 See “Basel III LR framework and disclosure requirements” 2014, for more detailed information 
CET 1 Tier 1 Total Capital Year
3,5% 4,5% 8,0% 2013
4,0% 5,5% 8,0% 2014
4,5% 6,0% 8,0% 2015-2019




sheet) should not be 33.3 times the bank's Core Tier 1 capital. National supervisors started 
monitoring the LR on 1 January 2013, and will analyze its effect on specific internal models. In 
2017 it enters the adjusting period and in 2018 it will be headed for a Pillar I implementation. 
 
4. Reducing pro-cyclicality and promoting countercyclical buffers 
 
The Basel Committee introduced some measures to make banks more resilient to pro-cyclical 
processes by ensuring that these could function as a “shock absorber, instead of a transmitter of 
risk to the financial system and broader economy”. 
The Committee proposed two capital buffers that banks will have to hold above the regulatory 
minimum. 
Countercyclical capital buffer. 
As the name indicates, this buffer serves to react against the pro-cyclicality process. This buffer will 
be implemented from 2016 to 2019 and it is supposed to be implemented as a phase-in process in 
which each year there is an increase of 0.625%, till reach the maximum of 2.5% of the RWA on 
2019. 
It ensures that the bank’s capital requirements take account of the macro-financial environment in 
which they operate. 
National authorities will monitor indicators (credit growth and etc.) and make assessments about the 
level of credit growth. Also, internationally active banks will look at the geographic location of 
their private sector credit exposures and compute their institution specific countercyclical buffer. 
Capital conservation buffer. 
The conservation capital buffer will be phased-in from 2016 to 2019. This buffer will have a 
maximum value of 2.5% comprised of Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio above the minimum capital 
requirement28. 
It ensures that banks build up enough capital outside periods of stress which can be drawn down as 
losses are incurred. Outside stress periods, banks should hold buffers of capital above the regulatory 
                                                     
28 CET1 must first be used to meet the minimum requirements (6% Tier 1 and 8% Total capital) before the 




minimum. However, when the capital level falls below the minimum requirement plus the buffer, 
banks should rebuild them through:  
i. Raising private capital in the market 
ii. Reducing earning’s distributions (dividend, share-backs and staff bonus) 
The constraints imposed only relate to distributions, not to the operation of the bank. 
The table below shows how the minimum capital conservation ratios will be implemented to the 
various levels of the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratios of banks. 
 
 
5. Addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness 
 
Not only pro-cyclicality amplified the downturn of the current crisis but also excessive 
interconnectedness among financial firms transmitted shocks across the financial system 
destabilizing the economy. For that, the Committee introduced the following additional issues: 
• Capital incentives to use CCP for OTC instruments 
• Higher capital requirements for trading activities 
• Higher capital requirements for inter-financial sector exposures, and 
• Introduction of liquidity requirements 
 
This last topic was extensively addressed by the Committee and is also one of the novelties 
introduced by Basel III. 
 
2.2.5.1 - Liquidity Proposals 
 
Table 4: Minimum capital conservation requirements 
CET 1 Ratio Min.Conservation Ratio
4,5% - 5,125% 100%
> 5,125% - 5,75% 80%
> 5,75% - 6,375% 60%





Throughout the liquidity phase problem in the beginning of the last financial crisis, many banks 
suffered liquidity difficulties as the market was being drained up. 
The introduction of liquidity requirements is meant to penalize excessive reliance on short-term 
interbank funding to support longer maturity assets, with the aim of reducing the spillover 
“domino” effect between banks. For that, the Committee imposed two minimum ratios for funding 
liquidity. 
 
1. Liquidity Coverage Ratio29 
 
This ratio ensures short-term resilience on a bank’s liquidity situation. It guarantees that banks 
always have a 30-day asset liquidity cover for emergency situations (stress scenario). The Basel 
Committee is proposing a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) defined as: 
 
 
Where the numerator (HQLA) stands for high quality liquid assets and must follow certain 
requirements. It includes instruments with a low correlation to risky assets, listed in active 
developed, stable and recognized exchange markets, with market makers and low concentration of 
buyers and sellers, and must be easily converted to cash in stressed markets. 
Example of high quality liquid assets: 
• Cash 
• Central bank reserves 
• Marketable claims on sovereigns, central Banks (CB), IMF etc. 
• Well rated government debt issued in the currency of the country 
• Eligible corporate and covered bonds 
 
Finally, the denominator (net cash outflows) is defined as the total expected cash outflows minus 
the expected inflows for the subsequent 30 days. 
                                                     





2. Net Stable Funding Ratio30 
 
This ratio ensures resilience on a bank’s liquidity situation over a one year time horizon. The NSFR 
objective is to limit an over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding and reassure a more serious 
assessment of liquidity risk across all on-and-off-balance sheet items as it ensures that long-term 
assets are funded with at least a minimum amount by stable funding (liabilities) in relation to their 
liquidity risk profile. 
Essentially, the Committee is proposing that the asset and liabilities liquidity characteristics of 
banks are matching the structure imposed by this ratio. 
 
The numerator (ASF) is the portion of the available amount expected to reliable sources of funding 
over a one-year period under stress conditions. It comprises various sources of different nature in 
which each one has a determined coefficient aggregated to. 
Example of available stable funding sources: 
• Total regulatory capital 
• Eligible stable deposits and term deposits 
• Operational deposits and other funding 
 
The denominator (RSF) is based on on-and-off-balance- sheet exposures and is the weighted sum of 
the liquidity characteristics of the various types of assets. 
Example of required stable funding: 
• Unencumbered Level 1, Level 2A & 2B Assets 
• Eligible residential mortgages 
• Other eligible loans and assets 
  
                                                     






3.3 - The Model: Introduction 
 
As seen, the implementation of the most recent framework presented by the Committee (Basel III) 
is a challenge to banks as it might increase pressure on a bank’s profitability. 
Researchers have tried for many years to analyze the decision process of financial firms to structure 
their balance sheet in order to meet shareholder’s and management’s expectations. Although the 
ultimate strategy applied could be a decision of the board, from the bank’s perspective, it is critical 
to benchmark the structure of its balance sheet instruments in an algorithmic process. 
Institutions will have to reevaluate their exposures in order to be compliant with Basel III and be 
profitable. Managing the balance sheet (BS from now on) is one of the key aspects that banks will 
reassess. Efficiently managing the BS by maximizing the returns, while taking into account 
conflicting goals such as strategic constraints and being in compliance with regulatory 
requirements, is a complex task. Given the particular aspects of each bank (risk appetite, strategy of 
the institution, dimension, etc.), managers are expected to know whether there is an “optimal BS” 
mix composition that would satisfy the objectives of the bank. 
In this section it is proposed a model that serves the institution to exactly achieve this goal. The 
model takes the initial BS (defined as Inputs inserted by the user) as the starting point and moves to 
an “optimal” BS, while taking certain restrictions into account. 
A user-friendly tool was constructed with the model in it, so that it can be used to advise banks on 
how their BS should be structured, while taking into account its specificities. It was built in Excel, 
VBA, and using the Solver as the optimization method (optimization algorithm). After the model 
determines the “optimal BS”, it presents the modifications made in the structure of the BS and the 
results obtained from it. 
This section describes the BS, how the tool deals with the different parameters, with future 
uncertainty (stochastic simulation), with the transition from one year to another and the constraints 
imposed. 







3.1.1 - Components of the Model 
 
As the model intends to portray the impact of the framework of Basel III on banks, the model was 
constructed to perform until the year of 2019. Having that said, the model forecasts the information 
obtained by the initial BS (Inputs) to the following years till 2019. For that, among other actions, 
the model constructs a yearly balance sheet and a profit & loss account31. 
As said earlier, the model focuses in the BS of banks to perform. However, there are two main 
difficulties in doing a standard model to fit to any bank: 
i. The BS of banks is composed by a great number of types of assets, liabilities, and even 
equity instruments, and 
ii. Each bank has its own BS composition with different types of assets, liabilities and 
equity instruments 
 
To take all the instruments into account would make the model too complex, slow and intractable. 
Consequently, the presented model has its own set of balance sheets’ instruments pre-defined. The 
BS of the model was made in a way that could be adapted to different types of banks. 
The tool has two main separated steps to perform. First, there is the introduction of several 
parameters as “Inputs” by the operator, so that the tool is calibrated to the institution. Therefore, the 
BS of each institution fits into the BS of the model. Once all the inputs (parameters) are defined, the 
second step is to run the model by clicking a defined button in the tool. The model automatically 
begins to perform several actions, and at the end of the simulation, the user can observe the output32 
of the model and compare the differences between certain parameters between the “initial BS” and 
the “optimal BS”. 
 
                                                     
31 More information about the profit & loss account and the yearly evolution of the BS in section 3.1.5 and 
section 3.1.8 respectively 




3.1.2 - The customized Balance Sheet 
 
The BS of the model has a total of sixteen (16) instruments and is composed by: 
• Nine (9) Assets instruments 
• Four (4) Liabilities instruments 
• Three (3) Equity types 
 




As the fundamental equation of accounting (balance sheet equation) shows, the balance sheet is in 
equilibrium when the sum of all the positions in the asset side equals the sum of those of the 
liabilities and equity side. Is not possible to go short on neither position of the BS, therefore: 
 
 
Also, the vector 𝑍 = (𝑍1, 𝑍2,…, 𝑍n), with n ε {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16} 
denotes the position of each instrument in the initial BS structure. Consequently, the vector ?⃗⃗? = 
(?⃗⃗?1, ?⃗⃗?2,…,?⃗⃗?n) denotes the position of each instrument of the “optimal BS” obtained by the model. 




Each item of the balance sheet is presented as a vector and has its own properties (disaggregation). 
Thus, they are sub divided into sub classes. In other words, each vector has its matrix (matrices) 
affecting it. 
A good example of a property is the maturity property. Apart from the ‘Cash & Equivalents’ 
instrument, all the BS items have a sub division of maturity.  
There are nine (9) different properties (sub classes). 
Each property is a matrix with dimension  𝑛 𝑥 1, and they are defined below: 






2. Credit Rating property:  𝐶𝑖 =  {1, 2, 3, 4} 
 
 





1 month - 6 months
    M= 6 months - 1 year













4. Type C property:  𝑇𝑐𝑖 =  {1, 2, 3} 
 
 
5. Type F property:  𝑇𝑓 =  {1, 2} 
 
 
6. Type K property:  𝑇𝑘 =  {1, 2, 3, 4} 
 
 
















8. Type T property:  𝑇𝑎 =  {1, 2, 3, 4} 
 
 




The total exposure of the left side of the BS (asset side) equals the sum of the individual exposures 





With Xi being the exposure per asset type i 
 













Likewise the assets, the total exposure of the liabilities equals the sum of the individual exposures 




With Xi being the exposure per liability type i 
Once again, in eq.2, each liability type has its own properties (sub classes) affecting it. 
 
Equity instruments. 
Lastly, the equity instruments are the ones left to define. The elements of the capital in the model 
are, as expected, in accordance with the framework presented by Basel III. Therefore, the capital is 
composed by three sub classes: 
• Common Equity Tier 1 Capital 
• Additional Tier 1 Capital 
• Tier 2 Capital 
 
 
The definition of each class is also in accordance to the Basel III framework. Thus, each element 
has its own instruments included, in accordance to what is discussed in section 2. Basel III. 
 
3.1.3 - Bounds & Strategy of the institution 
 
The balance sheet management is dependent on various variables, being the strategy and core 
business of the institution one of the most relevant. The strategy of the different types of banks 
(investment banks, commercial banks, retail banks, central banks, credit banks, savings & loans 




its own thoughts on the amount of exposure per position in each balance sheet instrument, and 
therefore, knows the interval (maximum and minimum exposures) on where it stands.  
The model considers this interval by using an upper and lower bound per position, ensuring that 
each position remains within the interval. The bounds are inputs of the model, thus, it is the 
operator’s accountability to define them. This helps defining the strategy of the institution by 
controlling how much exposure (with the corresponding risk), it want to hold in each instrument. 
















As referred before, there are two main steps to use the optimization tool. First, the user must 
introduce the parameters as “Inputs”, so that the tool is calibrated to the institution and the model 
could fit the bank’s specificities. 
In the input phase, there are eight (8) steps the operator must complete to successfully run the 
model. Below, is the description of these eight (8) steps: 
1. Set initial year: Set the initial year of the model. The model runs from the year 
given till 2019. 
 
2. Input of the BS: introduction of the values of the BS per position type and its 
respective sub class (property). 
 
3. Input intervals: insert the upper and lower bounds per position (both assets and 
liabilities instruments). 
 
4. Input Income/Expense: insert the income (expense) per asset (liability) instrument; 
the standard deviation for the expected future income (expense) till year 2019 
(stochastic process)33; expected growth and decline and its standard deviation per 
position (both on assets and liabilities instruments). 
 
5. Risk Profile34: choose the risk profile of the bank. 
 
6. Tax & Plowback rate: first, insert the tax rate and the plowback ratio attributable to 
the institution for each year. Secondly, define the allocation (in %) of the 
reinvestment of the retained profit in the assets (Loans and Corporate Bonds). 
 
7. Liquidity Ratios35: confirm or edit the Liquidity Ratios (LCR & NSFR) values. 
 
                                                     
33 The stochastic process of the model is explained in section 3.1.7 
34 The Risk Profile and its components is explained in section 3.1.6 
35 The liquidity ratios are associated to a risk profile, thus, they will be determined once the user chooses a 




8. Stochasticity36: choose whether the user wants the model to make certain 




3.1.5 - Profit & Loss account 
 
As referred previously, the model constructs a yearly Profit & Loss account (P&L), and is from it 
that the retained profit is obtained. The P&L account is formed by the various types of income and 
expenses incurred by the institution. The total income and expenses are generally produced (but not 
only) by the bearing assets and liabilities instruments respectively. 
Below it is defined the total income and expense: 
Income (year t). 
 
 
Expenses (year t). 
 
 
Retained profit (year t).  
 
 
                                                     




Therefore, is from the P&L account that the model takes the retained profit of each year. Then, the 
model reinvests it into the assets (in “Loans & Advances” and “Corporate Bonds”) at a rate defined 
by the user in “Step 5” of the “Input stage” phase. 
 
3.1.6 - Risk Profile 
 
As the previous section showed, the model has an embed option to choose the risk profile of the 
bank. The risk profile in the model is determined by the minimum values of the liquidity and capital 
ratios. Three risk profiles are defined: risk adverse, risk neutral and risk seeking. 
Essentially, the risk profile determines the values the financial institution wants to reach for the 
liquidity and capital requirements. All the risk profiles are in compliance with Basel III, 
consequently, the risk seeking profile complies just with the minimums required by the framework, 
and nothing more. The other risk profiles have a buffer above the minimums required by Basel III, 
being the risk adverse the most conservative one and therefore, presenting the highest minimum 
required ratios.  






In section 4 (Results), it is shown how the risk profile impacts the return on equity on ‘Bank I’, by 
running one simulation per risk profile. 
 
3.1.7 - Stochastic process 
 
Financial institutions generally have estimations for their expected income and expenses and the 
BS’s growth for the following years. However, these estimations are often not accurate. 
Also, as previously referred in the beginning of section 3.1.3. ”Components of the model”, the 
model forecasts till the end of year 2019. The parameters needed to the model perform are difficult 
to estimate since they are uncertain. As such, the tool is constructed so that the user has the choice 
to make certain parameters’ values normally distributed by assigning a mean and a standard 
deviation to each of them. 




By doing so, the model takes into account the uncertainty of the future and the eventual fluctuation 
of the variables year after year. 
There are two (2) types of stochastic parameters: 
i. Expected Income and Expenses of every year till 2019 
ii. Expected growth and decline of every asset and liability instrument 
 














Therefore, in this first case, taken from the income generated from each assets instruments (and 
other sources of income), defined by the user as an Input, the model computes the rate of return 
obtained from each asset instrument (plus the other sources of income) and with the volatility 
(measured by the standard deviation) inserted also as an Input by the user, the model gives an 
estimate for each year.  
In parallel, it computes the cost of each liability instrument (and other sources of expense), and 
gives an estimate for each year with the volatility (measured by the standard deviation) inserted as 
an Input by the user. 
The second stochastic parameters type, defines how the balance sheet evolves through time, in 














As the model evolves over time, by defining expected growth (new agreements) and the expected 
decline (attrition), with volatility measured by the standard deviation, the model gives an estimate 
of the effective growth per asset and liability instrument for each year. By doing so, the model 
obtains the effective yearly growth/decline of the models’ balance sheet. 
Concluding this section, it must be referred that the user has the option not to include the stochastic 
simulation if it has accurate estimates for the Income and Expense and the yearly balance sheet’s 
effective growth. This is done in (Step-7) of the Input phase. 
 
 
3.1.8 - Balance Sheet - Evolution 
 
This section was studied and constructed very carefully, as while the model performs simulations 
through time, the BS has to be always in equilibrium as given by the fundamental equation of 
accounting. 
Consequently, an increase/decrease of the right-side of the BS, has to be followed by an 
increase/decrease by the same amount, on the left-side of the BS. However, in order to have a smart 
and accurate optimization tool, this equilibrium must follow certain rules. 
It has already been seen that the model is set to run from the initial year till 2019. By default, the 
model is set to begin in the year of 2013. However, the tool gives the option to start the simulation 
from any year (> 2013), so that it could be used in the following years and not only in year 2013-
201437. 
Consequently, the operator must first choose the initial year in “Step – 1”, if he/she wants the model 
to run from any different initial year. 
The time-line of the model has now been set. Now, let us describe how the model transits from one 
year to another. 
We have already seen the two components that have impact in the BS evolution. Let us recapitulate: 
i. Yearly estimated growth (decline) of each asset and liability instrument 
ii. Yearly retained profit (RP) 
                                                     





Hence, the yearly expected growth (decline) of the balance sheet, depends on the weighted average 
growth/decline of the asset and liability instruments, and on the retained profit generated in the 
previous year. As described in the section “Inputs”, the user must choose in “Step – 6”, the 
allocation (in %) of the reinvestment of the retained profit in the assets. 























Thus, except for “Loans & Advances” and “Corporate Bonds”, all instruments evolve through time 
depending on its amount of exposure of the previous year and its expected effective growth/decline 
for that year. In the case of the two exceptions, we have to sum the respective portion of the 
retained profit (RP)38. 
Finally, the transition of the equity instruments can be described. As referred previously, to be in 
compliance with the Basel III framework, the total equity in the model is composed by three 










As observed, the evolution of the total equity is the most complex of the three types of instruments. 
First, we can describe the Additional Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital, as they evolve similarly. 
These two move through time according to the amount of exposure of the previous year and the 
growth rate of the total assets not taking into account the effect of the reinvestment of the retained 
profit in the assets of the previous year. The reason for this deduction is because (as it can be read 
on section “Basel III”) only the CET T1 is affected by the retained profit, whether positive 
(injected in CET T1), or negative (absorbed by CET T1), therefore, these two instruments 
grow/decline each year by the growth rate of the assets deducting the retained profit (RP). 
Finally, let us define the CET T1.  
The transition of the CET T1 is composed by four (4) sub-components.  
                                                     




i. First, it grows according to the growth rate of the assets (RP included). This component 
ensures that the CET T1 absorbs the retained profit, thus keeping up with the growth of the 
asset side of the BS. 
ii. The second component balances the disequilibrium arisen from the difference between the 
assets and liabilities growth rate. Therefore, it is constituted by the amount of liabilities of 
the previous year, multiplied by the difference between the growth rate of the total assets 
and the total liabilities. Obviously, if the total assets and the total liabilities grow at the 
exact same rate, this portion will be zero. Therefore, in case the liability’s growth is higher 
than the asset’s growth, the model assumes that and injection of capital (CET 1 capital) 
occurs in case the profits are not enough to cover this difference. After the simulation, the 
tool shows (“Output” sheet) the quantity of injected capital per year. 
iii. The third and the fourth component go in parallel and they are the last tranche needed to 
have equilibrium in the BS. They function similarly, being one affected by the Add T1 
capital and the other affected by the Tier 2 capital. They fill the gap obtained by the 
difference between the growth rate of the assets and the growth rate of the Additional Tier 1 
capital and the Tier 2 capital. This two components are constituted by the amount of the 
respective equity capital type (Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2) of the previous year, multiplied 
by the difference between the growth rate of the total assets and the growth of the total 
assets’ deducting the retained profit. 
 
This complex method of computing the CET T1, ensures that it absorbs the total retained profit 
(whether positive or negative) by itself, the difference between the growth rate of the total assets 
and liabilities, and the difference between the growth rate of the total assets and the growth rate of 
the Additional Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital. 
 
 






The credit risk valuation method built-in in the model is the Standardized Approach39. This 
approach attributes risk weights to the different type of assets to assess the capital requirement.  The 
risk weights are determined by the supervisory committee, and depend on the category of the 
borrower (sovereign, bank, corporate or retail), its rating, and the type of asset. 
To obtain the RWA of the total assets exposed to credit risk, the respective risk weights are 
multiplied by the amount of each asset position. Then, it is just a matter of adding all the risk 
weights, obtaining the total RWA’s. 
The following asset instruments are exposed to credit risk: 
𝑍𝑖 = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8,   
 
 2. Loans & Advances 
 3. Other Receivables 
 4. Government Bonds 
 5. Corporate Bonds 
 6. Mortgages 
 8. Fixed Tangible Assets 
 9. Other Assets 
 
The following matrices, reveal the risk weights of each instrument. The Corporate & Government 
                                                     
39 See the consultative document “The Standardized Approach to Credit Risk” - 2001, & “Credit Risk, the 




Bonds instruments, need to be separated according to its rating. 
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3.2.1 - Optimization technique formalization 
 
This section presents a simple example of the optimization problem built-in the model. It is shown 
how the Basel III constraints, ratios and variables were defined in the model. 
  
 


































Having all the Basel III constraints defined in the model described both in section 3 and 4, and 
taking into account a “Risk Seeking” profile, for example, we are now able to formulate a simplistic 
version of the optimization problem constructed in the model so that the reader can infer the 
direction of the approach taken41: 
 
   
Subject to:            
 
 
                                                     
40 See Annex 2 for the detailed description of the two liquidity ratios used in the model 








Concerning the implementation, and as previously referred, the model was constructed in Excel, 
VBA, and using the Solver – GRG Solving method. This method finds an optimal solution to a 





3.3.1 - Data & Assumptions 
 
The data of ‘Bank I’ was inserted in the tool (as an input), and in the next section 3.4.1 “Results”, it 
can be seen part of the performance and the improvements accomplished by the model. It can be 
verified whether the model managed to be in agreement with the liquidity and capital constraints 
and by how much it managed to increase the RoE (in basis points). 
The data of the input is taken from the financial disclosures of the year of 2013. 
Each asset (liability) instrument provides an income (expense). This income (expense) was obtained 
from the financial disclosures and was then transformed by the tool into a return (cost) rate. By 
doing that, the model observes which are the most profitable (costly) instruments. 
Let us refer the following assumptions taken42: 
i. Tax rate of the bank was assumed to be:      [23% −  25%43]  
ii. Plowback ratio:       [       50%    ] 
                                                     
42 See Annex 3 for more detailed information about the inputs used 




iii. Allocation of reinvestment of Retained Profit (𝞿):  [       50%    ] 
iv. Stochasticity of parameters used with the default values 
v. Lower and upper bounds as figure 4 shows below: 
 
Be advised that assumptions ii-v, where taken as a hypothesis by the author of this paper, taking 
into account the core business and strategy of ‘Bank I’. 
 
3.3.2 - Scenarios 
 
Two types of impact studies were done: 
i. Risk Profile – Impact Studies 
ii. Stress Tests – Impact Studies 
 
Concerning the risk profile impact studies, four different scenarios were simulated and their results 
discussed in section 3.4.1 “Results”. The scenarios are presented below in figure 5. 
Lower Upper
Cash & Equiv 90% 90%
Loans & Adv 70% 70%
Other Receiv 70% 70%
Gov Bonds 80% 80%
Corp Bonds 80% 80%
Mortgages 90% 90%
Fin A - trading 60% 60%
FTA 100% 0%
Other A 100% 0%
Deposits 90% 15%
Debt Sec 70% 35%
WF 60% 35%
Other L 100% 0%
Bounds




As figure 5 shows, four different simulations were run, to inspect the impact of each scenario on the 
return on equity (RoE). The first three take into account the liquidity and capital constraints, and the 
fourth scenario discards completely the liquidity constraints. This gives us a sense of the impact of 




Regarding the second group, two different stress tests were simulated. To infer the impact of the 
stress test, each one had three different levels. One simulation per level was run so that it allows us 
to observe the marginal impact on the various parameters in study and whether tendencies exist. 
Figure 6 below illustrates this group. 
 
Figure 5 – Risk Profile Impact Studies – 4  scenarios 






3.4.1 - Results 
 
This section discusses part44 of the results obtained by the model, using the data of ‘Bank I’ as the 
input. This is a commercial and mutual Portuguese bank that also provides small credit and 
investment services. 
As referred in the previous section, two groups of impact studies are differentiated, and it is shown 
its impact on RoE and on other several parameters. 
It would be interesting to see whether financial institutions are aware of their “optimal balance 
sheet”. If that was the case, the output of the model would be similar to the input (current 
composition). This would mean that the model could not find a different BS composition that would 
maximize the RoE while taking the Basel III requirements into account, and therefore, the bank was 
already in its “optimal BS” composition. 
In figure 7 (below), it can be compared the percent change, in absolute value, of the different BS 
instrument, between the “initial BS” (current composition) and the “optimal BS” composition 
obtained by the model (output for that year). This simulation used the inputs of ‘Bank I’, in the year 
of 2013, using the “Risk Seeking” profile. Be aware that the red squares point out which BS 
instruments changed negatively. 
To maintain confidentiality, the actual amount per position cannot be disclosed, however, in 
“Annex 3”, this information can be consulted. 
 
                                                     
44 Due to confidential aspects concerning the use of real data, it is not permitted to show certain values. 
Therefore, in Section IV 3.4.1 “Results” it is not shown all the information available in this thesis. See Annex 






It can be observed that ‘Bank I’ is far from being in its “optimal BS” composition. Moreover, it 
must be remembered that, as section 3.1.3 “Bounds & Strategy” explains, the model has an interval 
that constrains the change of the amount per position (upper and lower bound). Therefore, if the 
interval of the bounds were wider, the percent change would eventually be even higher. 
Finally, concerning figure 7, it should be noticed that the “Wholesale Funding” liability instrument 
is the item which varies the most (negative change). This is due to the fact that in terms of 
prudential requirements, this type of funding contributes poorly to the liquidity requirements, as it is 
seen as a highly risky liability instrument, thus being largely penalized by the model. 
As table 5 shows below, ‘Bank I’, as it is today and projecting its current situation to the following 
years till 2019, is not compliant with the liquidity constraints. 
Figure 7:percent change in absolute value from "initial” to "optimal BS” 








Therefore, after the model performs its simulation, it manages to compose the BS in a way so that 
‘Bank I’ is compliant with the liquidity constraints imposed by the Basel III. This can be observed 
by comparing the first and third line of table 5 of each liquidity ratio (LCR & NSFR). 
Figure 8 (below) displays the values of the “initial” and the model’s output of the liquidity ratios, 




Figure 8: LCR & NSFR: "Initial" (current) and output of the model for Bank I 
 
 
Table 5:liquidity ratios from "initial” to "optimal BS" 
OUTPUT
Liquidity Ratios
Year (t) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
LCR
Required LCR 50% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
"Initial" LCR 65% 55% 57% 48% 27% 24% 21%
LCR - Ouput 50% 50% 68% 73% 97% 121% 151%
NSFR
Required NSFR 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 100%
"Initial" NSFR 35% 35% 34% 27% 19% 18% 17%





On the contrary, as it can be seen in figure 9 (below), ‘Bank I’ as it is today, it is practically within 





It must be observed now if this change in the composition of the BS has a corresponding positive 
impact, in other words, an increment on the RoE while respecting the Basel III framework. 
For that, we refer the table 16 of Annex 4, which compares the values for the initial RoE and the 
output RoE obtained. Table 16 shows how the change in the composition of the balance sheet 
presented by the model, impacted positively the RoE. It not only managed to increase returns 
substantially and but also it made ‘Bank I’ to be compliant with the Basel III framework. 
 
 
3.4.2 - Risk Profile Impact Studies 
 
This section discusses the impact studies of the risk profile. 
Below in table 6, it is shown the results for the first simulation (“Scenario 1”). Beat in mind, once 
again, that due to confidentiality, certain values cannot be disclosed (RoE, BS dimension etc.). 




Therefore, instead of presenting the actual values of the RoE, table 6 presents its increment (in basis 
points) from the “initial” to the “optimal BS”45. 
 
3.4.2.1 - Scenario 1 
 
 
It follows that, even though ‘Bank I’ in the first scenario does not fulfils all the requirements 
imposed by the new framework, the model managed to change the composition of the BS so that 
‘Bank I’ becomes in compliance with the “Risk Seeking” profile constraints. 
Furthermore, as the last row of table 6 shows, it also increased significantly the RoE every year. 
It should be pointed out the significant increase of the “CET1” ratio. This is due to: 
 
i. Increase of retained profit (RP). The significant increase of the RP, which is consequence of 
the “optimal BS” composition obtained by the model, is every year completely absorbed by 
                                                     
45 See Annex 4 for the values for the RoE obtained by the model under the different scenarios 
OUTPUT
Scenario 1
BS Date (Year) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Initial
CET1 R 11,62% 8,43% 7,41% 10,41% 10,04% 9,65% 9,28%
AddT1 R 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12%
CTier1 R 11,74% 8,55% 7,53% 10,53% 10,16% 9,77% 9,40%
Total Capital R 12,09% 8,78% 7,73% 10,88% 10,51% 10,12% 9,76%
LR 7,06% 6,87% 6,60% 6,32% 6,09% 5,85% 5,63%
LCR 65% 61% 57% 53% 50% 46% 43%
NSFR 35% 35% 34% 34% 33% 33% 33%
Optimized
CET1 R 11,58% 8,63% 9,18% 13,34% 14,67% 16,69% 19,83%
AddT1 R 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12%
CTier1 R 11,69% 8,75% 9,30% 13,46% 14,79% 16,81% 19,94%
Total Capital R 12,05% 8,98% 9,53% 13,84% 15,19% 17,25% 20,45%
LR 7,06% 7,19% 7,39% 7,69% 8,06% 8,51% 9,05%
LCR 50% 50% 61% 70% 80% 119% 152%
NSFR 51% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 100%
ROE increase (BPS) 484 748 881 986 1065 1131 1194
Including Liquidity requirements - Risk Seeking




the common equity tier capital (right-side of BS). Thus, when the RP is highly positive 
(negative), the “CET1” ratio increases (decreases) not proportionally46 
 
ii. Decrease of the total RWA’s. The model is aware of the risk weights associated to each 
asset instrument, therefore, while it changes the composition of the BS, it takes also into 
account the total RWA’s value, for minimum capital requirements purpose. 
 
As a final note, the model improved significantly the financial situation of ‘Bank I’, especially 
considering the RoE and the liquidity ratios. It has also increased the capital ratios, even though 
apart from year 2019 (total capital ratio), did not need any apparent increment in this area. 
Next, it is shown the output of the second simulation which is the output of the model under the 
characteristics of “Scenario 2”. 
 
3.4.2.2 - Scenario 2 
 
                                                     
46 As the denominator of the Ratio (RWA’s) also changes 
OUTPUT
Scenario 2
BS Date (Year) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Initial
CET1 R 11,62% 8,43% 7,40% 10,43% 10,01% 9,64% 9,33%
AddT1 R 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12%
CTier1 R 11,74% 8,55% 7,52% 10,55% 10,12% 9,76% 9,45%
Total Capital R 12,09% 8,78% 7,72% 10,90% 10,48% 10,11% 9,80%
LR 7,06% 6,87% 6,59% 6,33% 6,07% 5,85% 5,66%
LCR 65% 61% 57% 53% 50% 46% 43%
NSFR 35% 35% 34% 34% 33% 33% 33%
Optimized
CET1 R 11,54% 8,57% 9,10% 12,72% 13,55% 14,37% 16,11%
AddT1 R 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12%
CTier1 R 11,66% 8,68% 9,22% 12,84% 13,67% 14,49% 16,23%
Total Capital R 12,01% 8,91% 9,45% 13,20% 14,03% 14,86% 16,63%
LR 7,06% 7,21% 7,39% 7,67% 7,99% 8,40% 8,83%
LCR 60% 74% 90% 111% 113% 116% 132%
NSFR 71% 70% 86% 90% 100% 109% 110%
ROE increase (BPS) 484 736 857 925 991 1028 1096
Including Liquidity requirements - Risk Neutral




Once again, the model managed to obtain an output in conformity with the restraints imposed by 
“Risk Neutral” profile. Remember that under “Scenario 2”, not only the capital ratios but also the 
liquidity requirements are above the actual minimums imposed by the Basel III framework.47 
Table 7 shows that the indeed the LCR & NSFR are equal or above the minimum values, and the 
same applies to the capital ratios. 
What is more interesting to see, and that was the actual point of this impact study, is that the “Risk 
Neutral” profile, when compared to the “Risk Seeking” profile, makes ‘Bank I’ not to have as high 
returns. The values are actually lower. Thus, we can affirm that for the data used and within this 
time period, ‘Bank I’ has lower returns when using the requirements imposed by “Risk Neutral” 
profile instead of the ones imposed by “Risk Seeking” profile. 
Moreover, as ‘Bank I’ demonstrated a truly comfortable situation regarding the capital 
requirements, we can affirm that the increase of liquidity requirements (only) between these two 
risk profiles, made the model to output lower returns. 
It would be interesting to see whether the third simulation follows this trend. 
 
                                                     
47 See section “Risk Profile” and section “Scenarios” for more detailed information about the three different 




3.4.2.3 - Scenario 3 
 
 
The model successfully obtained a conceivable output for the third simulation. More importantly, 
the model strengths our initial theoretical belief that with increments of liquidity requirements, the 
institution obtains lower returns. This can be seen by observing the last row of table 8 (above) and 
comparing with the results of table 7 & 8. 
The “Additional Tier 1” ratio not only remains unchanged between the three first scenarios, but also 
from the “initial BS” to the “optimal BS”. As a result, likewise the “Tier 2” capital, which is not 
disclosed in the tables, the model practically does not increases this ratio. This is due to the fact that 
this capital instruments grow in value at the same rate of the total assets not taking the retained 
profit into account. 




BS Date (Year) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Initial
CET1 R 11,62% 8,45% 7,43% 10,46% 10,08% 9,75% 9,43%
AddT1 R 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12%
CTier1 R 11,74% 8,57% 7,55% 10,58% 10,20% 9,87% 9,55%
Total Capital R 12,09% 8,80% 7,75% 10,93% 10,55% 10,22% 9,90%
LR 7,06% 6,89% 6,61% 6,35% 6,12% 5,92% 5,72%
LCR 65% 61% 57% 53% 50% 46% 43%
NSFR 35% 35% 34% 34% 33% 33% 33%
Optimized
CET1 R 11,55% 8,66% 8,90% 12,47% 13,51% 15,03% 15,79%
AddT1 R 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12%
CTier1 R 11,67% 8,77% 9,02% 12,59% 13,62% 15,15% 15,91%
Total Capital R 12,02% 9,00% 9,25% 12,93% 13,99% 15,54% 16,30%
LR 7,06% 7,21% 7,40% 7,64% 7,97% 8,40% 8,88%
LCR 85% 83% 97% 100% 110% 120% 133%
NSFR 70% 87% 90% 118% 124% 131% 130%
ROE increase (BPS) 484 728 806 906 1011 1082 1075
Including Liquidity requirements - Risk Averse








Table 9 (above) shows how would be if the liquidity constraints would be eliminated. Therefore, in 
this simulation, ‘Bank I’ would not have to deal with liquidity minimums addressed by Basel III.  
We see instantly that in general, the unconstrained liquidity ratios are a lot inferior to those of the 
other scenarios. It is even more consolidated the idea that for the data used, the capital and liquidity 
constraints have negative impact on returns. Thus, for ‘Bank I’, increasing capital and liquidity 
constraints reduces the RoE. 
Below in table 1048, it is shown the return on equity increase (in basis point) obtained by the model 
for the four simulations. 
                                                     
48 See Annex 4 for a similar table in which the values of the RoE are presented 
OUTPUT
Scenario 4
BS Date (Year) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Initial
CET1 R 11,62% 8,44% 7,41% 10,43% 10,05% 9,68% 9,37%
AddT1 R 0,12% 0,09% 0,08% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12% 0,12%
CTier1 R 11,74% 8,53% 7,49% 10,55% 10,17% 9,80% 9,49%
Total Capital R 12,09% 8,79% 7,73% 10,90% 10,52% 10,15% 9,84%
LR 7,06% 6,88% 6,60% 6,33% 6,10% 5,87% 5,68%
LCR 65% 61% 57% 53% 50% 46% 43%
NSFR 35% 35% 34% 34% 33% 33% 33%
Optimized
CET1 R 11,92% 9,70% 9,75% 14,43% 16,18% 19,65% 24,83%
AddT1 R 0,12% 0,10% 0,10% 0,14% 0,14% 0,16% 0,19%
CTier1 R 12,04% 9,80% 9,85% 14,57% 16,32% 19,81% 25,02%
Total Capital R 12,40% 10,08% 10,13% 14,97% 16,75% 20,30% 25,60%
LR 7,06% 7,19% 7,39% 7,69% 8,10% 8,58% 9,17%
LCR 111% 86% 99% 104% 146% 73% 0%
NSFR 13% 14% 15% 17% 19% 25% 32%
ROE increase (BPS) 484 759 895 1006 1092 1170 1235
Excluding Liquidity requirements - Risk Seeking







Now, it can be clearly seen that an increase in capital and liquidity constraints was followed by a 
decrease in returns (scenario 1, 2 and 3). And on the contrary, when liquidity constraints were 
eliminated, returns suffered a significant increment. 
From the “Risk Profile” impact studies, it can also be taken other interesting point, which is that the 
risk profile does not have any impact on the “LR”. It can be observed that within the four scenarios 
it did not follow any trend or change significantly. However, the model manages to increase this 
ratio when it is run, and this is applicable to all four scenarios. 
For a graphic perspective to the evolution of the return on equity (RoE) along the period, under the 
four different scenarios, we refer the reader to Annex 4. 
 
 
3.4.3 - Stress tests Impact Studies 
 
This section continues to analyze the impact on return on equity under certain hypothetical 
scenarios. These stress tests are part of the tool, so that the institutions could have an approximated 
idea of the impact in case a similar scenario materializes. The two scenarios are: 
 
i. Loan default 
ii. Deposit attrition rate increase 
 
OUTPUT
BS Date (Year) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Scenario
1 ROE increase (BPS) 484 748 881 986 1065 1131 1194
2 ROE increase (BPS) 484 736 857 925 991 1028 1096
3 ROE increase (BPS) 484 728 806 906 983 1003 1075
4 ROE increase (BPS) 484 759 895 1006 1092 1170 1235
Difference between first four scenarios




The tool is constructed so that the user can define the percentage of the loan default of the 
simulation (in the first stress test), or the percentage of the deposit attrition rate (for the second 
stress test). 
The first scenario is a common situation in the banking industry and banks have been making 
progress in measuring credit risk50 to control it. In this study, it is considered three different levels 
of defaulted loans (in percentage) so that it gives us insights about the trend of the impact. 
Concerning the second scenario, it is inspired in many situations that happened in the last financial 
crisis (2007), in which for one reason or another51, depositors picked their money up from banks 
they lost trust on.  
It is considered three different levels of deposit attrition rate. 
 
3.4.3.1 - Loan default. 
 
Table 11 (below), shows how this stress scenario impacted on certain parameters of ‘Bank I’. Once 
again, keep in mind that the RoE cannot be disclosed. Annex 5 reveals more detailed information. 
 
The column “RoE ∆ d (BPS)” gives the difference between the RoE under “normal” circumstances 
(0% loan default) and the RoE under each level of loan default. By observing this column, it can be 
easily seen that as the rate of loan defaults increases, the returns decrease significantly. This makes 
the CET 1 Ratio decrease by absorbing the losses derived from the loan defaults. Consequently, the 
Total Capital ratio also decreases. 
                                                     
50 “Bank loan losses-given-default: A case study”- J. Dermine and C. Neto de Carvalho (2006) 
51 Bank run, rating downgrade, improper practices etc. 
OUTPUT
Scenario A (t=2016)
Parameter CET1 R AddT1 R CTier1 R TC Ratio LR LCR NSFR ROE ∆ d (BPS) CET1 RWA
Initial
0% Default 13,64% 0,13% 13,76% 14,14% 7,73% 70,9% 80,0% 0 - -
2% Scenario i 12,3% 0,13% 12,4% 12,8% 7,0% 74,1% 80,0% -344 - -
5% Scenario ii 11,5% 0,14% 11,61% 12,02% 5,93% 70,6% 107,9% -1748 - -
15% Scenario iii 5,38% 0,18% 5,56% 6,08% 2,25% 70,0% 80,0% -15034 - -
Loan Default




The LR also drops as the total value of the owner’s equity loses proportion in the BS. Interestingly, 
it does not largely impact the two liquidity ratios.  
The RWA’s reduce in value as the item ‘Loans & Advances’ has a high risk rating, therefore, it 
contributes to the decrease of the total value of the RWA’s. However, the CET1 loses more in value 
proportionally, and that explains the decrease of the CET1 ratio52. 
Below, in figure 9, the four scenarios are illustrated in a graphic in which the values for the y-axis 
(value of RoE) are not disclosed. It intends to portray the decrease of the RoE as the loan default 
increases. 




It is visible the drastic decrease of the RoE as the loan default rate increases. 
 
 
3.4.3.2 - Deposit attrition rate increase. 
 
Concerning the second stress tests, it would be interesting to see whether a sudden increase in the 
deposit attrition rate would have any impact in the financial parameters of ‘Bank I’.  
                                                     












First, it must be mentioned that table 12 shows the figures of ‘Bank I’ in the immediate moment 
after the deposit withdrawals happen. 
Again, the column “RoE ∆ d (BPS)” gives the difference between the RoE obtained in normal 
circumstances (no increment in the deposit attrition rate) and the RoE obtained for each scenario. 
This column shows that even though there is a clear negative correlation between deposit attrition 
rate and RoE, this relation is not as drastic as in Scenario A, therefore, returns have low 
sensitiveness to deposit withdrawals. 
It follows that the LR53 also increases in value. It is explained by the following: 
As the numerator (C Tier 1) remains constant, with increases in the deposit attrition rate, the 
denominator (Total Assets) decreases. 
A big impact on the LCR is observable. As depositors withdraw their savings from the bank, the 
institution has not that quantity of liquid assets to deliver the clients the amounts of money at such a 
short notice. For that, has to first liquidate their most liquid assets (Cash & Equivalents, 
Government Bonds), making the short-term liquidity ratio (LCR) to go far below the requirements. 
Also, as ‘Bank I’ relies a lot on retail deposits for its funding purposes, even a withdrawal of five 
percent has a significant impact in its funding liquidity situation. 
Finally, the NSFR seems to be just slightly affected, as it relies on medium term funding to finance 
the assets. 
                                                     
53 We refer the reader to page 22 on this paper to more information on the “LR” 
OUTPUT
Scenario B (t=2015)
Parameter CET1 R AddT1 R CTier1 R TC Ratio LR LCR NSFR ROE ∆ d (BPS) ROE CET1 RWA
Attrition rate
0% 12,40% 0,12% 12,52% 12,88% 7,41% 61,8% 70,0% 0 - - -
5% Scenario i 12,6% 0,12% 12,7% 13,0% 7,7% 0,5% 68,5% -16 - - -
15% Scenario ii 13,8% 0,12% 13,89% 14,23% 8,51% 0,3% 70,3% -98 - - -
30% Scenario iii 14,74% 0,11% 14,85% 15,16% 9,99% 0,1% 61,3% -483 - - -
Deposits attrition rate increase




Once again, as the RoE cannot be disclosed, figure 10 (below) illustrates a graphic of the four 
scenarios, in which the values for the y-axis (value of RoE) are not disclosed. 
 
 
Just as table 12 illustrated, figure 11 shows that increases of the deposit attrition rate, makes the 
RoE to drop in value sharply.  
In figure 18 of Annex 5, it can be observed the same graph with the y-axis values (RoE) included. 
Concluding, we refer the reader to the following link (below), to see how the tool works: 
http://financialcleavage.wordpress.com/  






4.1 – Conclusion 
 
This study uses a balance sheet optimization model to overcome the existing challenges of the new 
regulatory framework presented by the BCBS under the name of Basel III. The study focused on 
regulation related to capital and liquidity requirements. The data used consisted on the financial 
figures of a Portuguese commercial bank for the year of 2013. Results show that the model 
succeeds in providing a plausible improved output. 
Under the data and assumptions used, it was shown that the model manages to present a balance 
sheet composition that increases the return on equity of ‘Bank I’. Adding to that, it makes ‘Bank I’ 
to be it in compliance with the new regulatory framework presented by Basel III during the whole 
phase-in period. Hence, ‘Bank I’ as it is today, does not have an “optimal balance sheet” 
composition that enables it to maximize profits while making it compliant with Basel III, under the 
assumptions of this exercise. 
Furthermore, the impact of the new regulation framework on profits of ‘Bank I’ was estimated and 
explored. Results indicate that as capital and liquidity requirements increase, ‘Bank I’ presents 
lower and even negative profits. Therefore, as F Pasiouras et al (2009)54 discuss, stricter regulation 
related to the first Pillar has a negative impact on bank profits. 
Moreover, the stress tests performed by the model give an alert to the susceptibility and exposure of 
‘Bank I’ to corporate loans and mortgages, as these asset types comprise a big chunk of the bank’s 
total assets. According to the outputs of the model concerning the stress tests, a default on this type 
of asset has a big impact on profits. In fact, it makes ‘Bank I’ not to only be very far from the 
minimum requirements of the Basel III framework, but also presenting highly negative results. 
Finally, this paper points out the reliance of ‘Bank I’ on retail deposits as the primary source of 
funding. Even though this source of funding is considered insensitive to risks (are often insured), 
and, as Huang & Ratnovski 55 discuss, provide a stable source of long-term funding, ‘Bank I’ 
                                                     
54 “The impact of banking regulations on banks’ cost and profit efficiency: Cross-country evidence”- F 
Pasiouras, S Tanna, C Zopounidis (2009) 




undergoes a stress financial situation in case of withdrawals. Thus, to overcome this sensibility the 




As for further research on the topic, it would be interest to capture the cost of changing each 
position of the assets and liability instruments (change composition of the balance sheet) so that this 
expense would be included in the calculations of the optimization model. This inclusion would only 
be possible if banks would have the information about the cost of changing one unit of each 
instrument, something that is not currently made. 
Concerning the customized BS, its usage has the big advantage to be adaptable to every bank and it 
remains possible to model relatively quickly. The disadvantage is that the actual BS is specific for 
each bank. Hence, a possible extension of the model would be to replace the BS presented in the 
model by a much more detailed balance sheet. However, this would make the simulation much 
more complex and therefore slow, as it would optimize above the already existing thirteen 
dimensions. Moreover, it would not embody more accuracy in the parameters in study (capital and 
liquidity ratios, RoE etc.), as the instruments included in the optimization tool were chosen with the 
care of including all the instruments explored by the Basel III consultation papers. 
As regards to the stress testing, it would be interesting to explore more intensively this section of 










1. For instance, it may appear to be good business to originate risky loans with their 
accompanying high interest rates.  However, if the internal models calculate that these loans 
default more and thus need more capital charged against them, the loans may not be as 
profitable as lower risk, lower earning loans that require far less. 
2. Example: 
Safe loans: > 1 year maturity; PD = 0.25% ; LGD = 1% of the outstanding amount 
Risky loans: > 1 year maturity; PD = 1% ; LGD = 10% of the outstanding amount 
 
($10 M X .25% = $25,000) 
($25,000 X 1% loss rate = $250) 
For a $10 M portfolio of the safe loans, the bank would expect to see $25,000 in defaults in 
a year and a loss on the defaults of $250 
 
($10 M X 1% = $0.1 M) 
($0.1 M X 10% = $10,000) 
For a $10 Min a risky portfolio the bank would expect to see $0.1 million in defaults in a 
year and a loss on the defaults of $10,000 
 
Since the expected loss on the very risky portfolio is forty times greater than that of the safe 
portfolio, the bank would be obliged to put forty times more capital for the risky portfolio than for 







Stock of HQLA 
   Factor  
  Level 1 A    
 z1,1 Cash & Equivalents 100%  
 z1,2 - Marketable securities 100%  
 z6,1,1 - Government Bonds (0%) 100%  
  Total L1   
  Level 2 A    
 z6,1,2 - Marketable securities 85%  
 z4,1,1 - Corporate Bonds (0%) 85%  
  Level 2 B    
 z7 - Mortgages (RMBS) 75%  
 z4,1,2 - Corporate Bonds (20%) 50%  
 z4,1,3 - Corporate Bonds (50%) 50%  
  Total L2    
  Total HQLA   
     
 Cash Outflows    
 z Deposits   
 - Retail & Small Business  < 1 month   
 z5,1,1,1  Stable deposits 5%  
 z5,1,1,2  Less stable deposits 10%  
 z9 Unsecured WF   
 z9,1,1 Overnight I. Lend 25%  
 z9,1,2 REPO market 100%  
 z9,1,3  Sovereign, CB, PES's 40%  
 z9,1,4  Non-fin Corp 40%  
 z5,1,2,1 Unsecured WF non-fin C (Stable)  40%  
 z5,1,2,2 Unsecured WF non-fin C (Unstable)  40%  
 z8,1 Unsecured WF by other legal customers  100%  
 z5,3  - Banks 40%  
 Total Cash Outflows   
 Cash Inflows    
  Loans & Advances   
 z2,1,1 - Retail loans 50%  
 z4,1,i - Corp Bonds (all R) 50%  
 z2,1,3 - Retail loans 50%  
 z2,2 - From Fin- Institutions 100%  
  Other Receivables   
 z3,2 - From Corporate 50%  
 z3,1 - From Fin-Institutions 50%  
 Total Cash Inflows   
 Net Outflows   
LCR 





Factors Required stable funding assets 
   Factor  
     
 z1 & z6,1,1  - Assigned L1 in LCR 5%  
 z6,i & z4 - Assigned L2A in LCR 15%  
 z4,i,3 & z7 - Assigned L2B in LCR 50%  
 z2,2,2 - Loans to banks >6m 50%  
 z2,1,2 & z2,3,2 




 z2,i,3 Loans to non-fin (32.e) 50%  
 z7,>3  - Mortgages > 1y 65%  
 z2,>3,1 - Retail > 1 y 65%  
 z4,>3,i - Corporate Bonds > 1y 65%  
 z2,>3,3 Loans to non-fin (34.a) 85%  
 z11 Fixed Tangible Assets   
 z11,1 - PPE 100%  
 z11,2 - Non-held for sale 100%  
 z11,3 - Other Tangible Assets 100%  
 z2,>3,2  - Loans not included above 100%  
  Total Required   
     
Factors Available Stable Funding Assets 
     
 z5s Deposits - Stable < 1 y   
   - Retail& Small Business 95%  
 z5nsr Deposits - Less Stable < 1 y   
 z5corp  - Retail& Small Business 90%  
 z5,<4,i 






z9,3,1 - Funding p: CB & Banks 6m-1y 50%  
 z9,3,2 - WF - REPO 50%  
 z9,3,4 - WF - Corp Wholesale 50%  
 z9,<3,1 Other Liabilities 0%  
 z8 - All other liabilities 0%  
     
  SE   
  - Total Equity 100%  









Parameters/Inputs of ‘Bank I’: 
 
‘Bank I’’s balance sheet composition 
(in thousands of €) 
 
𝑋𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ & 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣 =     337605 
𝑋𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 & 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 =    7096102 
𝑋𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 =    233792 
𝑋𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 =    1700879 
𝑋𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 =    730161 
𝑋𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 =    8439929 
𝑋𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐴−𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 =    563755 
𝑋𝐹𝑇𝐴 =    1187426 
𝑋𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =    685627 
 
𝑋𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 =    13801758 
𝑋𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠 =    1045902 
𝑋𝑊𝐹 =    4164123 
𝑋𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 =    438892 
 
𝑋𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 =    1465121 
𝑋𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 =    15000 











 Lower Upper 
Cash & Equivalents 90% 20% 
Loans & Advances 70% 35% 
Other Receivables 70% 20% 
Corporate Bonds 80% 25% 
Government Bonds 80% 25% 
Mortgages 90% 20% 
Financial Assets held for trading 60% 30% 
Fixed Tangible Assets 100% 0% 
Other Assets 100% 0% 
Deposits 90% 15% 
Debt Securities 70% 35% 
WholeSale funding 60% 35% 
Other Liabilities 100% 0% 
 
Table 13: Default bounds per BS position 
 
 
Tax Rate & Plowback Ratio 
 
  Rates 
  Tax Rate Plowback 
2013  25% 50% 
2014    23% 50% 
2015  23% 50% 
2016  23% 50% 
2017  23% 50% 
2018  23% 50% 
2019  23% 50% 
 







Reinvestment percentage allocation of Retained Earnings (𝞿) 






2013  50% 50% 
2014  50% 50% 
2015  50% 50% 
2016  50% 50% 
2017  50% 50% 
2018  50% 50% 
2019  50% 50% 
 
Table 15: Default rate of percent reinvestment of RP 
 
 
Growth & decrease per BS instrument 
 
𝑔 (𝑋𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ & 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣)𝑡~𝑁 (0.07, 0.00)   𝑑 (𝑋𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ & 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣)𝑡~𝑁 (0.02, 0.00) 
𝑔 (𝑋𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣)𝑡~𝑁 (0.07, 0.01)   𝑑 (𝑋𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣)𝑡~𝑁 (0.02, 0.01) 
𝑔 (𝑋𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 & 𝐴𝑑𝑣)𝑡~𝑁 (0.07, 0.01)   𝑑 (𝑋𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 & 𝐴𝑑𝑣)𝑡~𝑁 (0.02, 0.01) 
𝑔 (𝑋𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠)𝑡~𝑁 (0.07, 0.01)   𝑑 (𝑋𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠)𝑡~𝑁 (0.02, 0.01) 
𝑔 (𝑋𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠)𝑡~𝑁 (0.07, 0.01)   𝑑 (𝑋𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠)𝑡~𝑁 (0.02, 0.01) 
𝑔 (𝑋𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠)𝑡~𝑁 (0.07, 0.01)   𝑑 (𝑋𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠)𝑡~𝑁 (0.02, 0.01) 
𝑔 (𝑋𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐴−𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡~𝑁 (0.07, 0.03)  𝑑 (𝑋𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐴−𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡~𝑁 (0.02, 0.03) 
𝑔 (𝑋𝐹𝑇𝐴)𝑡~𝑁 (0.03, 0.0)    𝑑 (𝑋𝐹𝑇𝐴)𝑡~𝑁 (0.01, 0.0) 
𝑔 (𝑋𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡~𝑁 (0.03, 0.0)   𝑑 (𝑋𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡~𝑁 (0.01, 0.0) 
 
𝑔 (𝑋𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠)𝑡~𝑁 (0.058, 0.0)    𝑑 (𝑋𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠)𝑡~𝑁 (0.01, 0.0) 
𝑔 (𝑋𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠)𝑡~𝑁 (0.058, 0.0)   𝑑 (𝑋𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠)𝑡~𝑁 (0.01, 0.0) 
𝑔 (𝑋𝑊𝐹)𝑡~𝑁 (0.058, 0.0)    𝑑 (𝑋𝑊𝐹)𝑡~𝑁 (0.01, 0.0) 









Table 16: Comparison between initial RoE and the output obtained by the model 
 
Table 16 shows how the change in the composition of the balance sheet presented by the model, 
impacted positively the return on equity. It managed to increase returns substantially and at the 
same time, ‘Bank I’ it is now compliant with the Basel III requirements. 
 
Risk Profile Impact Study 
It is shown below in figure 10 an example of how much the model changed the composition of 
‘Bank I’s’ balance sheet and for the inputs defined (bounds, risk profile, tax & plowback rate… 
etc.). It gives us the composition of the “initial” and the “optimal BS” obtained by the model for 
each assets & liability position, in the actual amount. This is a sample taken from the year of 2018 




Year (t) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Initial -4,5% -6,3% -6,2% -6,1% -6,0% -5,9% -5,8%









Below in table 17 are presented the values for the return on equity (RoE) for the current “initial” 
situation of ‘Bank I’ and the output of the model under the four different scenarios. 
 
OUTPUT        
"Optimized" RoE for the 4 scenarios 
 BS Date (Year) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
          
 RoE         
  Initial  -4,5% -6,3% -6,2% -6,1% -6,0% -5,9% -5,8% 
  Scenario        
  1 0,32% 1,22% 2,61% 3,75% 4,60% 5,39% 6,14% 
  2 0,32% 1,03% 2,38% 3,17% 3,93% 4,44% 5,20% 
  3 0,32% 1,00% 1,86% 2,94% 3,50% 4,31% 4,94% 
  4 0,32% 1,33% 2,74% 3,93% 4,90% 5,79% 6,56% 
          
 
Table 17: Model's output BS composition from "initial" to "optimal" BS to each scenario 
 




As table 17 shows, ‘Bank I’ presents negative profit for the year of 2013 and it would also present 
negative results for the upcoming years if would not change its BS’s composition56. However, the 
outcome proposed by the model allowed ‘Bank I’ to obtain significantly higher returns, even 
positive in this case. 
The risk profile impact study done in this thesis, shows once again the negative relation between 
capital & liquidity constraints and return on equity. Table 17 demonstrates how the increase of 
capital & liquidity requirements, make ‘Bank I’ to have lower returns. Consequently, “Scenario 3” 
presents the lowest returns as it has the highest ratio requirements. On the contrary, “Scenario 4” 
presents the highest returns, as in this scenario, the liquidity requirements are abolished. 
Below, there are four figures that present the evolution of the return on equity (RoE) under the 





                                                     
56 If we consider that the BS instruments would provide the same income (assets) and the same expense 
(liabilities)  











Figure 15: RoE evolution under "Scenario 2" 







Figure 17: RoE evolution under "Scenario 4 






Stress tests – Impact Studies 
 
 




Table 18 confirms the significant impact of loan default on the return on equity. Observe that just a 






Parameter CET1 R AddT1 R CTier1 R TC Ratio LR LCR NSFR ROE ∆ d (BPS) ROE CET1 RWA
Initial
0% Default 13,64% 0,13% 13,76% 14,14% 7,73% 70,9% 80,0% 0 4,2% 1862122 13656891
2% Scenario i 12,3% 0,13% 12,4% 12,8% 7,0% 74,1% 80,0% -344 0,7% 1678642 13683032
5% Scenario ii 11,5% 0,14% 11,61% 12,02% 5,93% 70,6% 107,9% -1748 -13,3% 1396445 12174401
15% Scenario iii 5,38% 0,18% 5,56% 6,08% 2,25% 70,0% 80,0% -15034 -146,2% 501126 9310483
Loan Default











Concerning scenario B it can be confirmed, by observing table 19, what was already illustrated 
before. In fact, the impact of deposit withdrawals has a significant less negative impact on return on 
equity. However, the short-term liquidity ratio (LCR) is highly impacted due to the decrease of high 
quality liquid assets (HQLA). 
  
Table 19:  Stress scenario-Deposit attrition rate increase 
Figure 19 – Deposit attrition rate impact on RoE 
OUTPUT
Scenario B (t=2015)
Parameter CET1 R AddT1 R CTier1 R TC Ratio LR LCR NSFR ROE ∆ d (BPS) ROE CET1 RWA
Attrition rate
0% 12,40% 0,12% 12,52% 12,88% 7,41% 61,8% 70,0% 0 3,0% 1696741 13685333
5% Scenario i 12,6% 0,12% 12,7% 13,0% 7,7% 0,5% 68,5% -16 2,8% 1684771 13582533
15% Scenario ii 13,8% 0,12% 13,89% 14,23% 8,51% 0,3% 70,3% -98 2,0% 1705034 12381049
30% Scenario iii 14,74% 0,11% 14,85% 15,16% 9,99% 0,1% 61,3% -483 -1,9% 1713328 11624017
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